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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
In times such as these when science is the god to
whom the age pays homage, it is pro£itable to have some
knowledge o£ a philosopher whose metaphysical ponderings
were an attempt to establish a middle course along which
science and metaphysics could travel.

Since "science seeks

to describe in terms o£ the phenomenal",l

it is well to dis-

cuss a philosophical system which helps to give depth and
breadth to the con£ined sphere o£ the scientist and which
bolsters science with a rational basis.

Francis Suarez made just such an attempt throughout his £amous philosophical treatise, Disputationes Metaphysicae.

More than any

or

the scholastics be£ore him, he

strove to strengthen his scheme o£ thought by use of empirical £acts.

What success he obtained by this novel mode of

procedure may be decided from these words
Suarezian scholar.
physics

or

or

an eminent

In an interesting article on the Meta-

suarez, while treating of the Doctor's theory o£

i------.--Fulton J.

Sheen. Philosopr: of Science.
ing Co., Milwaukee, 1934, • -1

The Bruce Publish-

2

cognition, this author says:
Another great thesis flowing directly from this central doctrine of
creaturehood is Suarez's position
on cognition. This doctrine is of
paramount importance for the present
day because it represents the one
serious gesture which scholasticism
has made to join hands with science.2
The prime purpose and definite end ot this thesis,
therefore, is a study of Suarez's concept of prime matter,
the ultimate material cause of things, and the rejection of
Suarez's concept as a safe middle course.

A brief history

of the problem of change which comprises the views of the
more important philosophers both ancient and scholastic,
is thought to be the logical approach to the entire discussion.

Such an approach gives the reader a broader and

more comprehensive view of the subject.

Under a separate

heading Suarez' position will be brought to light.

In

this section some stress will be placed on his concept of
entitative act which is essential to prime matter according
to his metaphysical reasoning.

Herein lies his point of

departure from the traditional teaching of Aristotle and the
Angelic Doctor.
Through a critical analysis of this entitative
2-H~t;r-Guthrie. "The Metaphysics of SuarezV
June, 1941, 297.

Thought.
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act it is hoped that its nature and its function will be clearly de£ined.

Reductively, it leads to an admission o£ compo-

sition in the essence of prime matter.

From this it wiil be

£urther concluded that, since prime matter has composition in
its very essence, being cannot be considered as a substantial
unity but merely an accidental aggregation of complete substances.
The conclusion of this thesis will but reiterate
the findings of chapter four, but with this important addition:
The influence of Nominalism on the metaphysics of Suarez will
be pointed out in order to add weight to the conclusion that
being cannot be anything but an accidental composite if entitative act is permitted metaphysical validity.

With the

Nominalists Suarez denied the real distinction between essence
and existence, thereby forcing himself by way of a corollary
to postulate entitative act £or prime matter.

Furthermore,

his approach to metaphysical problems was highly empirical,
and from an empiricist's point of view prime matter must
possess some degree of perfection.

This degree of perfection

is the entitative act which leaves prime matter with essential
composition, and gives rise once more to the dilemma of Parmenides.
This chapter can now be brought to a close with a

4

statement of the central point towards which the thesis is
directed:

What is this entitative act of Suarez and what is

its metaphysical validity as an essential constituent of
prime matter'

CHAPTER II
A HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
It has been deemed advisab1e, before beginning
any analysis or Suarez's position on the essence or prime
matter, to set down by way or a history of the p)roblem,
what same or the more important thinkers who attacked the
problem before Suarez, thought on this poiht and what conclusions they reached.

This procedure will give a clearer

picture or the subject as a whole, and will make subsequent
analysis much easier.
The crux of the whole problem lay in the famous
dilemma of Parmenides, who was the first to give lasting
impetus to the perplexing enigma of change.

His denial

or change of any kind and his adherence to a monistic and
materialistic concept of being followed directly tram his
theory of cognition which can be stated in the following
terms: "idem est cogitare et esae". 1

Unlike Berkeley's

principle, that of Parmenides sets forth the complete intelligibility of being which, however, was joined with

y-H;;;;~-Diels. Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker. I

Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin, 1934, Parmenides,
No. 3. 231.
5

6

perfect imaginability, making the being with which he dealt,
sensible being.
From this principle of cognition is immediately
deduced his first metaphysical principle, "ens est, non-ens
non est",2 which implies wdthin its scope, that being, since
it is sensible, exists in its fulness, but a vacuum, which
according to Par.menides is non-being, does not exist.

Furthermore, since being does not differ from
being by reason of being, and since being cannot be differentiated by reason of non-being(which is not), Par.menides
was forced to conclude that being was absolutely and unequivocally one.

From this premise he is led to declare

that the actual multiplicity of being along with the potential multiplicity is utterly absurd, and an illusion of
the senses .3
Why must the mutability of Parmenides's monistic
being be denied?
result.

Change would imply that something new would

But this change, according to the famous Parmenidean

dilemma which Aristotle formulates in his Physics~ is 1m3~-.---------~., Nos. 2,6.
231, 232.
Ibid.
4 Aristotle. Physics. The Works ofAristotle. Translated
under the editorship of W.D. Ross, M.A., Oxford at the
Clarendon Press, 1928, I, 8, 19la, 23 - 24.

7

possible.

The dilemma is sufficient proof for the utter

impossibility of change:

"aut fieret ex ente aut ex non-ente;

ex ente autem fieri non poteet. hoc enim jam est;
ex non-ente;

ex nihilo nihil fit"~

Therefore being as it

is found is the one and only possible thing.
can be had;

sed nee

Nothing new

nor can what is already had• be in any way

changed.
If the second horn of the dilemma be considered
in relation to the purely corporeal world in which creation
in the strict sense plays no part. then it is obviously
true that. "ex nihilo nihil fit".

The first half of the

dilemma. a finding consequent upon the metaphysics of Parmenidea, is also true if being and non-being are contradictorly opposed. as Par.menides expressly states.

In fact

not only must the multiplicity of being be denied. but also
intrinsic change of any kind whatsoever.
Par.menides and his followers went even further in
their far-reaching denial of local motion.

What was there

in the idea of local motion that was not in agreement with
their metaphysics?

According to their way of viewing the

problem. local motion postulated the existence of a vacuum.
But, as has already been stated. a vacuum which is non-being
is utterly absurd.
5-~~~-~--~~

Diels.

Therefore the local motion which de-

No. 8. 236.

8

mands this vacuum is equally preposterous. 6
Examined in the light of Parmenidean

metaphysics~

mere numerical division of indivisible beings was found
wanting and

so~

are as follows:
immutable;

rejected.

The reasons for this rejection

division would imply change and being is

division supposes that all the parts of the

being divided would be actuated simultaneously and so could
be dissolved into parts which had no extension;

finally

division would require a vacuum which does not and cannot
exist. 7
Parmenides~

therefore, on metaphysical grounds

argues to the unicity and absolute immutability of being.
Since his conclusions are the result of intellectual cog•

nition and since the senses seem to contradict the data
presented by the intellect, he denies the veracity of these
gates to the outside world.

However, in spite of the errors

he championed, he did leave to those who followed him a
problem which could be solved only on metaphysical grounds.
Unless the solution were metaphysical, and not purely empirical, as was that of Diogenes who attempted to solve the
problem of local motion by merely

walking~

the dilemma

would remain untouched, and leave to puzzled posterity an

~----------7 ~., 238.
~.,

237.

9·

apparent contradiction between metaphysical and sense cognition.

Therefore a theory which purposed to save the

appearances of things was necessary.

Such was the solution

offered by the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus.
Leucippus and Democritus, though staunch defenders
of the doctrine of Par.menides, wanted so to apply his principles that the conflict between intellectual and sense
perceptions would be allayed.

In the supremely mechanical

system they p;ropounded the material cause of all things
was made up of an infinite number of indivisible atoms, which
were similar and of the same nature.
are of one mind with Par.menides.

So far, the Atomists

Change, substantial and

accidental, corruption or generation, was wrought by variations in the position, figure, or relationship of the atoms.
All mutation in being could be explained with the help of
the vacuum, non-being, which, according to Leucippus and
Democritus, •non minus existit quam ens".

As can be seen,

this was decidedly a radical departure from the first principles of Parmenides.

However, the Atomists were of the

opinion that if the vacuum were introduced, the gap between
the world that is perceived by the senses and that which is
perceived by the intellect, would be bridged. 8
Multiplicity was the first type of change which

e-~ld::-II, Leucippus and Democritus. No. 156. 174, 175.
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this theory

or

or

the Atomists was to save.

Through the medium

the vacuum would be had ideal conditione ror the inri-

nite and actual multiplication

or

being.

Yet these multi-

plied beings would retain the unicity and indivisibility
which Parmenides

~edicated

or

his being.

extrinsecally and intrins!cally incapable
extended~

they would be indivisible;

could not be had;

nor two from one.

They woulld be

or

change;

though

for from two, one
The metaphysics of

Parmenides excluded any such possibility.
Local motion in the vacuum was to be the solution
for the apparent multipliability of being, and consequently,
would account for generation and corruption.

The former

would be brought about by an orderly arrangement of the
atoms;

the latter, by disorder among the infinite parti-

cles.

Yet, as must be insisted, all this corporeal activi-

ty was merely apparent.

Nothing became;

being remained

unchangeable. 9
Subsequent philosophers endeavored to give greater cogency to the position assumed by Parmenides and the
Atomists, or they allied themselves to principles diametrically opposed.

To the former belonged Zeno and Melissus

who went to great lenghts in order to advance convincing
proofs which would demonstrate the metaphysical tenets of

g---.-----Ibid.

-
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Parmenides.

Zeno, indirectly proposed proofs which had for

their theme local motion, which he totally rejected, since
he considered it an illusion of the fallible senses.

Melis-

sus, his contemporary, attempted the same thing, with this
exception- Melissus's method was more direct.

The conclu-

sions at which he arrived were the same as those reached by
Zeno.

However, he did add one new note to the idea of being

which cannot be found in the teachings of either Par.menides
or Zeno.

Being as conceived by Melissus was infinite.

But

by this it would seem that he meant infinity in a sense in
which it was not used in later philosophical systems.
infinity was one which belonged to magnitude.

His

His final

conclusions, however, were those of Parmenides:

Being is

immutable and one.10
The school of Greek thought which set out to disprove the doctrines of Parmenides, had for its chief exponent, Heraclitus, whose fundamental thesis was:
is;

all is becomingn.ll

"Nothing

According to this principle, which

he claimed to be the result of much intellectual labor,
things are in a constant state of flux.

They are constantly

being evolved from the first material by a process of con-

ft)-------~., I,

Melissus, No. 1. 268. ,
ll Ibid., Heraclitus, No. 91. 171. •lao Plato. Crat~lus.
1rito. (Loeb Classical Library). Translated by H••
Fowler. London: William Heinemann. 1926, 402a.

12

denaation, or are returning to it by rarefaction.
What is the first matter with which Heraclitus
was concerned?

According to him it was a subtle substance,

etheral and invisible, which partook of the nature of fire.
Further, it was intelligent and living. 12 Hence it was not
only the world-body, but also the world-soul.

It was a god

of some sort which governed the world, while at the same
time it gave the universe ita bulk or mass.
gent, it was not free.
ruled it. 13

Though intelli-

Blind and inexorable necessity

While little can be said 1n behalf of the theory
of Heraclitus, since it left the first part of Par.menides's
dilemma unsolved, two points are worthy of note.

In the

first place,
Heraclitus did not conceive the primordial fire as a mere mass of matter
shaped into various accidental forms
(mechanistic monism), but as an all
pervading reason operating by its own
power(dynamism), according to fatalistic necessity, forming bodies that
differ essentially (pluralism), and
reducinf these again to its own substance. 4
The other point which merits attention is the
12----~---~

No. 113. 176.
13 Diels.
Ibid. , No. 90. 171.
14 PiUl J. Glenn, Ph.D. Historz £!Philosophy. B. Herder
Book Co. St. Louis Mo. l934 53.

13

deep and lasting influence Heraclitus had on those who
followed him.

It is especially noticeable in Plato's ideas

on prime matter and the problem of change.

As has been

said, his theory was in itself of little value as a solution to the enigma, but it did show one thing:

a theory

which would explain the dilemma and would contradict neither
metaphysics nor sense cognition, had to be found.

In

other words Heraclitus put the question more directly and
in a manner that was a challenge.
Before going on to the true solution of the whole
problem of change, a few words on the teaching of Plato
would not be

am~ss.

To decide precisely what Plato's views

on this subject were, is no easy task.

At times it seems

that the problem was not entirely clear to Plato himself.
That he had ideas about the essence of prime matter is
evident from his works;

but these ideas were subject to

change without notice.
In general, it can be said that Platonic prime
matter was a determined substance of a sort 15 •hich in some
way came under the influence of the world-soul.

Corporeal

bodies were made up of earth and fire, the former g1ving
solidity, the latter, light and heat.

Is-------Plato. Timaeus.

These two elements

Plato. (Loeb Classical Library) Translated by R.G.Bury, Litt.D. London: William Heinemann,
1929 48aff. Sla.

14
had nothing in common, and so demanded two further elements,
air and water, that they might fuse and give a new substance.
Now ir the first two elements are ultimately composed of prime matter, as he says they are,l6 why have they
not at least this as a common substratum whiCh will form a
basis for fusion?

Why is it necessary to have recourse to

two other elements which are equally diverse?

Plato him-

self realized the haziness of his concept of prime matter.
In the Timaeusl7 he tells us that it is known by a sort of
spurious reason and that it is something scarcely to be considered a matter 2f belief.
difficulty is to be found.

In this, some inkling or Plato's
He realized that a principle

of limitation and a substratum of change was required, but
such a principle as finally formulated by Aristotle, was
out of gear with Plato's first principles and with a system
that was idealistic.l8 Here again another philosopher tries
to solve the problem of change, and still another was left
hanging on the first horn of the dilemma:

"ex ente non fit

ens".
It was not until the time of Aristotle that a

is-i~~~:--30a,

17 _ ,
18 ~., 52b.

Glenn.

35a.

55, 56.

15
theory of being was formulated and presented which satisfied the exigencies of metaphysics and natural sense phenomena.

This was the famous doctrine of Potency and Act.

Between the two extremes of the Parmenidean being and the
Heraclitean "becoming" Aristotle placed his tertium quid,
potency, which merely said that being already existing had
the capacity to acquire further perfections which it did not
possess.

From this principle he could explain the phenomena

which for centuries had troubled the philosophers.

By apply-

ing this general principle of Potency and Act to natural
bodies he was able to account for change on metaphysical
grounds.

He argued somewhat in this manner:

All bodies

have something within them, common to all, by reason of which
they are bodies;

they have some principle or substratum

which makes them bodies.

What is this common element?

Aristotle said that,
Matter, in the most proper sense of
the term, is to be identified.with
the substratum which is representative ~~ coming-to-be and passingaway.
From other texts of his, various generic and specific descriptions of the material cause of all things can be culled.

In

the Metaphysics he describes matter thus:

i9-A;l;t~tle.

De Generatione !i Corruptione. The Works of
Aristotle. Translated under the editorship of W.D. Ross,
M.A., Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1928, I, 4, 320a,. 2.

By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing
nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by
which being is deter.mined.20
In the Physics is found the following:
For my definition of matter 1a just
this- the primary substratum at
each thing, from which it comes to
be without qualificatioft and which
persists in the result. 1
Appealing to an analogy Aristotle further enlarges upon
his notion of prime matter.
For· as bronze is to the statue, the
wood to the bed, or the matter and
the formless before receiving form,
so is the underlying nature to the
substance, i.e. to the this of existent.22 - ---Prime matter, therefore,is a medium between
being and non-being;

it is not absolute nothing because

every natural body has prime matter as an essential part
of itself.
Our doctrine is that although
there is a matter of the percept20--~~---~

Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated under the editorship of W.D. Ross, M.A., Oxford at the Clarendon Press,
1928, VII, 3, 1029a, 20.
21 Aristotle. Physics. I, 9, 192a, 31.
22 Ibid., 7, 19la, 32.
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ible bodies (a matter out of which
the so-called "elements" come to be),
it has no separate existence, but is
always bound up with the contrariety.23
In other and more familiar words, the matter for its existence
requires the form which specifies the matter,
tinguishes one body from another.
ly passive;

!·~·

which dis-

Of itself matter is utter-

all activity comes to it through the form.
For to begin with,
istic of matter to
i.e. to be moved;
to-act, belongs to
'power•.24

it is charactersuffer action,
but to move, !·~·
a different

Or it can be more briefly expressed: "As to the 'matter' it
(qua matter) is passiven.25
With certain reservations Aristotle goes so far as
to class prime matter as a substance, understanding always
that it is an incomplete substance and a co-principle of
being.

When he does call it substance, there is always at

least implied the notion of ttpoten-tial".
The substratum is a substance,and
this is in one sense the matter
(and by matter I mean that which,
not being a 'this' actually, is a
'this' potentially.)26

~~-A;i;t~tle.

De Generatione ~ Corruptione. II, 5, 329a, 24.
25 Ibid., 9, 3350, 29.
26 Ibid., a, 324b. 1a.
Aristotle. Metaphysics. VII, 2, l042a, 23.

18

It is the stui'f from which, through union with the substantial for.m, the composite becomes;

and for almost the same

reason, prime matter, which of itself is incorporeal, is
spoken of by Aristotle as a potential nature.
Prime matter is one because it is the substratum
or tirst subject of all change.

As Aristotle says:

It is therefore better to suppose
that in all instances of comingto-be matter is inseparable, being
numerically identical and one with
the 'containing' body, though inseparable from it by definition.27
Prime matter is unchangeable because,
--- we have stated that the substratum is the material cause of
the continuous occurence of coming-to-be, because it is such as
to change from contrary to contrary and because, in substances,
the coming-to-be of one thing i•
always the passing-away of another,
and the passing-away of one thing
is always another's coming-to-be.28
Prime matter is pure potency and not pre-determined to receive this form rather than that.

"As to the matter, it

(~matter)

is passive".29 In itself it is absolutel¥ in-

deter.minate;

its sole function is to form the substantial

~~ Aristotle.

~ Generatione ~ Corruptione. I, 5, 320b, 12.
I, 3, 319a, 15.
29 Ibid., I, B, 324b, 18.
~.,

19
substratum of all bodies and to be the basis of change without ever being changed.

Aristotle brings out this idea of

prime matter being pure potencty in his famous description.
By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing
or of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by
which being is determined.30
It is real but by no means actual.

To become actuated it is

necessary that it receive the substantial form for which it
has an essential attraction.
The truth is that what desires the
form is the matter, as the female
desires the male, and the ugly the
beautifu1- only the female or the
ugly not per ~ but per accidensvl
So much for Aristotle's doctrine • . It is very important, in view of what will be said of Suarez's notions of
prime matter, to note what Aristotle lays down as its essence.
He iasists on its being pure potency and on its being indeterminate.

Otherwise there would be no complete solution

of the problem of change.

Philosophers prior to Aristotle's

time failed to solve the problem precisely because they were
ignorant of the idea of pure potency.

For them there were

two extremes:

being and non-being;

from neither could

30 Aristotle.
31 Aristotle.

Metaphysics. Vll, 3, l029a, 20.
Phys i cs. I , 9 , 192 a, 20 •

l

20

being be derived.

With Aristotle's clear notion of a prime

matter which was an incomplete being and which of itself was
totally indeter.mined, change could be explained.

Being in

potency is capable of receiving any form whatsoever in its
own order.

In the case of generation and corruption in the

wide sense, the result of the change is substantial which it
would not be if prime matter were in any way determined by
its very nature.

Any union with prime matter already deter-

mined would ba merely accidental, thereby admitting no fundamental and complete explanation of the problem of change.
As will be seen, this is Suarez's point of departure from the
teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas.
With Aristotle's doctrine on this subject presented
more or less clearly, little need be said of the teaching of
St. Thomas, since he merely reiterates Aristotle's theory.
For him all being which is subject to change is composed of
potency and act.

Bodies were composed of matter and form.

Prime matter is pure potency and has no existence apart from
the substantial form.
In the system of philosophy and theology which has
come to be known as the Thomistic system, the Aristotelian
principle of potency and act along with the notions of matter
32-st:-Th~mas. Summa Theologica.I, q. 66, art. 1. ad 3.
77, art. 1. ad 2. q. l5, art. 3, ad 3.

q.

21

and form, and essence and existence, were more widely applied
by St. Thomas than by Aristotle himself.

Nevertheless, the

principles remain basically the same, and they alone offer
the true metaphysical solution to the Parmen1dean puzzle.

r

CHAPTER III
SUAREZ'S DOCTRINE ON PRIME MATTER
Now that aome

tamiliari ty with the problem ot

change as a whole haa been achieved, a non-contentious discussion ot Suarez's position regarding this problem is possible.

Since there are many points on which he was in com-

plete accord with Aristotle and St. Thomas, these will be
treated briefly, that time and consideration may be given
to those ideas ot his whiCh show divergences trom the commonly accepted opinions ot Thomas and Aristotle..

The discrepan-

cies in the two schools ot thought will beoome evident in
the latter part of this chapter which deals with the reality

ot prime matter.
If Suarez's notions of matter are to receive the
comprenen.ion they deserve, it is necessary, as a preliminary
step, to bear caref'ully in mind his denial of the real distinction between essence and existence.

On this single prin-

ciple hinges Suarez's postulate of the ent1tat1ve act in
prime matter.

The logic in the postulate 1a evident.

If

essence and existence are identical, then in the essential
order prime matter, though considered as pure potency in
22

23

relation to the informing act, cannot be without some act
which will give it reali t}" independently of this informing
act.

Various citations from the Disputationes Metaphysicae

show bey-ond the shadow of a doubt that he held and defended a logical distinction between essence and existence.l
However much Suarez may- have differed with Aristotle
on certain de.f'ini te phases of the problem, he had no fault
to find w1 th the theory of matter and form in 1 ts broader
aspects.

In fact upto a certain point there is not the

slightest note of' discord.

In the beginning of his treatise

on prime matter Suarez's chief concern is to prove that there
is euch a thing as a basic material cause of all things.
His arguments tor ita existence, though long and searching
are all reducible to one head, substantial change in living
substances.

Presc1nding trom ita nature and the form which

it :may receive, Suarez finds that such a thing as prime
:matter is as evident aa the substantial changes which are
constant occurrences within the experiences of'

everyone~

As

can be seen at a glance, this statement is based on empirical observations rather than on any metaphysical exigency.

1-R:;:-p;~cisci Suarez e Societat Jesu. Opira Omnia. Editio

Nova. Par1a1is: Apud Ludovicum Vives, Bib iopolsm Editorem,
1856, Disputationea Metaphzsicae. Disp. XXXI, Sect. 6, n.
23. also Dlap. XV, Sect. 9, No. 5.
2 Ibid.,Disp. XIII, Sect. l, No. 4.

-

r----------------------------------~
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However, tram these a.pirical facta Suarez is easily able to
transfer his line of argumentation into the realm of metaphysics, and produce a proof whiCh carries conviction.

Argu-

ing from the repugnance the intellect .finds in explaining
anything by recourae to an inf'inite aeries, he deftl7 shows
tnat prime matter is not only the basis of all change, but
also the ultimate basis.
Igitur vel illud subjectum supponit aliud aubjectum vel non,
si non suppon1t, illud est primum et habetur intentum. Si
vero suppon1t aliud, quaeram
de illo; est autem evidens non
posse procedi in infinitum; ergo
necessario sistendum est in aliquo prSmo subjecto seu materia
prima.
•·
If any further proof is needed to make this argument con-

clusive, it can be readil7 found b7 considering other forms
of change, such as generation, corruption, and nutrition.
Den7 an ultimate basis of change and these everyday phenomena will have to be attributed to nothing leas than creation
and annihilation; an explanation as repugnant to metaphysics

as it is to ordinary experience.4
As an immediate corDllary from what has been said,
Suarez is easily able to prove that there is but

3-Ibld::-io.
4-'

4.

Ibid., Nos. 5 1 8.

~
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material cause.

Again his reasoning flows :from the impossi-

bility ot an infinite series, but this time the principle is
considered :from a different angle.

This constant regression

is out ot the question because in the series one would be
faced with a procession of mutually dependent subjects of
change.

Furthermore, these dependent subjects are composed

and can be further resolved into simple substrata.

With

metaphysical necessity a wholly independent and simple subject must be reached and this is prime matter.5
From this it is but a simple step to conclude to
the tact that primordial matter is a simple substance.

So

after refuting Thales and those ancients who taugnt that
prime matter was something integral, and after rejecting the
forma corporeitatia of Scotua and Henry ot anent, Suarez
takes sides with Aristotle in defending the aimpllci ty of
matter.6
So tar Suarez has explained, "quid non sit materia,
quam quid sit 0 • 7 Now he feels himself to be in a position to
take up the positive and more contentious side of the problem.
It is at this juncture that the force ot his denial ot the
real
makes itself felt.
5.. _._,__,..distinction
______
Ibid., lfo. 10.
Sect. 3, No. s.
7!,2!2.., Sect. 4. No. 1.

sIbid.,
-
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of identifying essence and existence, some kind of act must
be given to prime matter.

Suarez's mode of argumentation

will help to throw light on this statement before this Chapter is ended.
Suarez open3 this section with a consideration of
those facts in the case upon which there is mutual agreement.
From Aristotle's Metaphysics and other works, he shows that
the material cause of things joined to the substantial fo:rm
has true reality, and that it is really distinct from the
form.B Matter must have reality or real entity;
it would be nothing.

otherwise

Matter must have reality of itself

because of the part it plays in the generation and corruption
of substances.

If it had no reality of its own, change

would be nothing more or less than creation and annih1lation.9
Furthermore

thi~eality

must be substantial reality.

reasons for this are obvious.

A complete substance cau be

made up only of substantial parts.
part of every natural substance.
tial reality.

The

But prime matter is a

co-

Therefore it is a substan-

But matter, besides being a substantial part

8-ut-;;;~-ab his, quae certa videntur, incipiamus, primo

indubitatum esse videtur, materiam, quae actu est sub
forma, et cum illa compon1 t substantiam corpoream, habere
aliquid entitatis realis et substantialia, et realiter
distinctae ab entitate formae. ~., Sect.4, No. 2.
9
~.,No. 3.
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of the complete substance, adds something to the compos! te;
and

this something is substantial, not accidental.lO So

argues Suarez, and since he is discussing an uncontroverted
point, nothing further need be added by way of comment.
In conclusion to all this he asserts that matter
must be really distinct from the form, "quia materia est
entitas realiter separabilis a qualibet forma particular!
determinata, quod satis est ut a forma sit in re ipsa d1stincta".ll This distinction between mattS.. and form, since the
form. is not a mode, ia a real distinction.

D1atinguitur ergo

materia a forma tamquam rea a ren.l2
Now Suarez is ready to venture forth alone and give
his answer to the question, "an materia ex ae habeat aliquam
entitatem actualem?" 13 He is tully cognizant of the difficulties of his position and the criticism to whiCh he is exposing himself.

Yet he positively asserts:
••• materia prima ex se et
non intrinaece a forma habet
auam entitatem actualem
essentiae, quamv1s non habeat
1llam, nisi cum 1ntrinseca habitud1ne ad formam.l4

10___ ._ ___ _
ll Ibid., No. 4.
Ibid., Ho. 5.
12
1 nmr.
Ibid., No. a.
1 ~ ~.,
No. 9.

r
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suarez insists that he ia here using the terminology of his
adversaries lest controversy should arise.

How a difference

ot ppinion is at all possible is beyond him!

Matter as

found in the composite must have a real essence if it is to
retain its title as a real being.l5
reality from the actuating for.m.

Nor can it have this

For for.m can give essential

entity to a nature only when it is the"act of a real passive
potency., in union with which it forms a composite.

Therefore

not the potentiality but the composite is the term of the
form's causality.

Consequently., the essential reality of

matter cannot be communicated to it by the form;

for prime

matter is essentially a simple entity like its form., and the
primary composition results from the conjunction of the two.l6
Further confirmation can be gathered if it is remembered that
every simple entity is of itself constituted in its own
essential nature.

No intervention of another entity can

bring this about.

If it were otherwise., there would be noth-

ing to distinguish it from the eomposite.l7
Suarez's next argument is based on the incomplete
nature of the l}laterial cause and the fact that such a nature
cannot be intrinsi3eally derived from the form.
it is valid and conclusive:

is-ibid:--

16 Ibid.
17
Ibid.

-

To his mind

r
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•'

••• quia ai formam includeret,
nihil illi deesset ad ratione.m
completae essentiae. 'l'andem
ex ipsa ratione purae potentiae,
hoc ipsum colligitur; nam si
materia haberet suum esse essent1ae 1ntr1nsece per formam, in
suo essential! conceptu 1ncluderet aetum formae, non ut 1ntr1naecum terminum, seu add1tum,
sed ut 1ntr1nsecum actum formalam cons t1 tuentem, at que non
esset pura potent1a.lB

Although prime matter has its own reality independently of the form, Suarez is most insistent that it does not
have this reality without a transcendental relation to the
form, "quia essentialiter est potentia", and in the words of
Aristotle is, "primum subjectum".l9

His argument is based

on the intrinsic relationship which exists between potency
and act.

This relationship is not to some specific form,

but to form in general.

In matter the forms may vary in pro-

portion to the changes which occur, but the intrinsic relation
which matter has to form never changes.

Furthermore, the

fact that this relationship never changes is but a fUrther
vindication of the thesis that matter does not get its essential reality through a union with the substantial form.
Since this argument is so important, it is here given in fUll.

18.. ____ .,. __ _

omnia potentia dicit 1ntrinsecam
hab1tud1nam ad suum actum; pro-

19 llli.·
Ibid., No. 11.
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prius autem actus materiae est
forma; habet ergo materia suam
propriam essentiam per seipsam
cum habi tudine ad formam. Haec
autem habitude non est per se
primo ad hanc vel illam formam,
sed ad formam absolute, et consequenter ad quamcumque formam
generabilam, -seu quae per generatione.m uniri possit, et ideo
quamvis in materia varientur
formae, non variatur essentialis
ratio vel habitude materiae. ~od
$t1am est clarum argumentum materiam non habere entitatem essentiae
ab informatione formae.20
Suarez now sets out to reconcile his doctrine on
the essence of prime matter with Aristotle's teaching that it
is pure potency.
reconcilable.

At first glance the two positions seem ir-

Suarez thinks not.

For him the crux of the

difficulty lies in a proper interpretation of "pure potency".
According to Thomas ao4 the Thomists, matter is pure potency,
"Quia neque ex se neque in se habet ullam existentiam nisi
per formam.n21

Capreolus, Socinus, and Javellus are cited

as opponents of this theory.

Scotus and Henry of Ghent, oa

the other hand,are of the opinion that there is a twofold
kind of act, formal and entitative.

....

In their writings,

Materiam docent ex se habere actum entitativum, non tamen formalam, et consequenter aiunt mater!-

_.., __ _.. __
20 Ibid.·
21
- Sect. 5, No. 2.
Ibid.,

r
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am vocari puram potentiam in ordine ad actum formale.m, non vero
in ordine ad actum entitativum. 22
Following Scotus and Henry of Ghent, Suarez incorporates this entitative act into his concept of prime matter.
Going even fUrther, he makes bold to state that the concept
is not at all foreign to Aristotle.
assertion?

How does he justify this

Act is the correlative of potency.

Now there

must be as many types of act as there are of potency.
enumerates three:

He

passive, active, and logical, but excludes

active as having no bearing on the question.

Bow a thing

may be thought of as in act with respect to receptive potency,
and also merely with respect to objective potency.

Matter,

therefore, though pure potency with reference to informing
acts, is not mere objective potency and so must be said to
be in act, or to have its own entitative act.
Materia ergo prima, quamvis sit
prima pura potentia receptiva, atque ita in sua essentia nullum includat actum formalem, quod significatur per istud vocabulum, pura,
nihilominus postquam creata est, non
poteet dici in pura potentia objectiva~
ergo hac ratione recte dicitur esse vel habere actum entitativum.23

However, a mere assertion that the idea, "pure potency", does
no.t:.uclude every act is not sufficient unless there be con~~--

............

23 ~~i&·· No. 9 •

• , Bo. 4.

vincing evidence for the contention.

Suarez offers the

following:.
Primo quia materia prtma in
conceptu essential! poteet
intelligi ex genera et dif.ferentia composita; ut, verbi
gratia,si materia coeli et
horum inferiorum distinguuntur specie, haec materia
de qua nunc agimus, non
stat genera materiae in communi et propria differentia,
quae sumt poteet ex ordine
ad .formam entia generabilis;
habet ergo materia suum actum for.malem metaphysic~,
quo ~n suo esaentia oonat1tu1tur.24
The gist of this proof can be given briefly.

For genus the

earthly bodies can be considered as having certain matter
common to both earthly and celestial bodies, and for difference, its relation to the form of a corruptible body.

From

this, matter of itself can be said to have its own metaphysical act.
This last argument gains greater force, according
to Suarez, if the following line of reasoning is taken into
consideration.

Matter o.f itself has some perfection and

goodness which belong to it regardless of the form.
states his position in the following manner:
24

!E,!2.., No. 9.

Suarez

Et confirmatur, nam materia natura sua ali<pam perfectionem
et bonitatam transcendentalem
habet, ••• Certum est, enim,
compositum ex materia et forma, perfectius quid esse quam
sit sola forma; ergo aliquid
perfectionis habet materia,
quam addi t compos! to. Itam
ipsa materia est appetibilis
et conveniens, non tantum ut
medium, sed per se, quia ratione suae perfectionis est conveniens huic formae vel composito; ergo habet materia ex natura sua ali~am propriam perfectionam; sed non potest intelligi
perfectio sine actualitatis aliqua,
saltem transcendentali.25
From all this reasoning 1 t can be concluded that
matter is pure potency in relation to the informing act,
because suCh a concept is not included in the formal concept.
However, it cannot be said that, "materia prima ita est pura
potentia, ut excludat omnem actum metaphysicum actuante.m".
Whether or not all this ratiocination brings Suarez's theory
of prime matter into line with that of Aristotle, may still
be a doubtfUl issue for some, but not for Suarez.

Aristotle

may state in express and open terms that prime matter is
something entirely without form.

For Suarez this causes not

the slightest hesitation •

25 ______ ,.. ... _.

••• per haec autam et s1milia
dicta solum excluditur a materia amnia actus formalis et com-

Ibid., No. 10.
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ple.tus, non vero actus enti tativus, incompletus, et quasi incohatus, sine quo realis potentia
receptiva esse non potest.26
Thus we have briefly sketched the more important
ideas whiCh Suarez conceived of the essence of prime matter.
Most important ofJthese ideas for the purpose of this thesis
are those notions on the actuality of matter considered by
itself.

It is here that Suarez sets himself' apart from his

master, Aristotle, as well as from the Angel of the Schools,
St. Thomas.

All else he has to say on prime matter has its

roots in that one notion:

Matter has of itself and indepen-

dentl7 of the form, something ot reality.
Yet in this he is but being logically loyal to his
first principles, and particularly to his denial of the real
distinction between essence and existence.
been logical, there is little doubt;
another question.

That Suarez has

that he is correct is

This question we shall now attempt to

answer in the following chapter which will be a critical
analysis of the Suarezian position.

~s·

....-.... -- No.

~.,

13. Also Aristotle. Phzsics. I, 9, l92a, 20.

CHAPTER IV

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SUAREZ'S DOCTRINE
This chapter purposes to analyze critically and
evaluate a series of objections which Suarez proposes after
his treatise on prime matter as pure potency.

While the ob-

jections themselves merely anticipate the obvious attack an
adversary would make against the Suarezian doctrine and concept of matter, and offer no particular difficulty in understanding, the answers given are of interest as well as of
importance.

In these is to be gained a clearer knowledge of

Suarez's position and of the metaphysical difficulties to
which ' it leads.

Furthermore, it is hoped that this analysis

will likewise show, or aid in showing, that the entitative
act in prime matter as conceived by the Doctor Eximius, if
pushed to its logical extremities, leaves all metaphysical
explanations of change in the same unhappy pass Par.menides
found them.l
Why should Suarez's theory of prime matter cause
this reversion to the Par.menidean dilemma?

This question

can best be answered by a statement of his position.

!_..,
______ __theory of prime matter is the same as that of
Suarez's
Chapter II, 1, 2.
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Aristotle or it is different.

From what has been said in the

preceeding chapter, it is obvious that Suarez was propounding a system that was a radical departure from the traditional view.2 But if the Suarezian system is different, then this
entitative act is act in the strict sense of the term as used
by the scholastics.

Otherwise ehtitative act would be a

modus loquendi,and would affect
not at all.

th~

essence of prime matter

However since the system is different, this act

is act strictly interpreted.

It can be concluded, therefore,

that prime matter is composed of essence and existence.

In

other words matter is the complete being Parmenides said it
was, and not the incomplete being postulated by
and the scholastics.

~istotle

The analysis which now follows will

help, by specific examples, to make this deduction clearer
and more concrete.
first difficulty which Suarez proposes is word-

~1e

ed as follows:
Prima, quia absque esse nullus est
actus, quia nihil habet actualitatem nisi in quantum est, et ideo
ipsum esse est actualitas omnium
rerum, ••• ; sed materia non habet
esse, nisi per for.mas ••• ; ergo.3

________
.. _
What
precisely
is the state of the question?

The adversary

2 Chapter III, 20,21.
3 Suarez. Disputationes Metaphysicae. Disp. XIII, Sect. 5,
No. 16.
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is saying that without existence there is no act.
matter has no existence except through its form.

However,
Therefore

matter has no act of itself.
Although Suarez's handling of the objection is
brief,it is sufficient to deepen one's insight into the
Suarezian concept of prime matter.

Before analyzing the re-

sponse which is based on an interpretative exposition of the
scholastic principle,

~~!§!A

FORMA, the answer as

given by Suarez will be quoted.
Omne esse est a forma duobis modis
exprimi poteet. Primo, de esse specifico et completo. Secundo, quod
omne esse est a forma, vel intrinsece
dante et componente illud, vel saltam ter.minante aliquo modo dependentiam ejus, et hoc modo ipsum esse
dici potest esse a forma, quatenus
ab illa pendet ••• 4
For the sake of greater clarity the formal distinction which Father Harper makes in his treatment of this same
objection will here be given in summary fashion.

In sub-

stance it is the same as Suarez's answer, but put in language which is more readily understood.
Harper's response centers around the notion of
being which is absolute and complete, and being which is incomplete. Applying these notions to the difficulty of the
4----~----~., No. 17.

38

adversary, he finds that it would be a valid objection if it
etates that without existence coming from the form, there is
no act complete or incomplete, absolute or dependent.

How-

ever, if the adversary wishes to imply, (and he does) that
without existence coming from the form there is no incomplete
and dependent act, then the objection must be denied.

Prime

matter, he says, can and does have incomplete and dep.endent
act.5
While this response can be attacked on several
scores, facility in handling it seems to demand that the examination be restricted to a discussion of incomplete and
dependent act.

St. Thomas, following Aristotle, considered

prime matter as incomplete being.
it ·is an
.!!!!! quod.

~

In the terms of the school,

quo, as opposed to the composite which is an

This !!!.! quo, prime matter, was pure potency, 6

capable or receiving any form decided upon by the efficient
cause.

In itself, it could not determine: it could only be
5-T,h;-M;J~r must be distinguished. There is no entitative
act without being, either absolute and complete or incomplete and dependent,-- granted; absolute and complete
on1y,-- denied. The Minor is contradistinguished. The
form gives absolute and complete entity or being to Matter,granted; incomplete and dependent,-- there is room for a
subdistinction: It gives being by reducing the potentiality
to act,-- granted; it gives being in the sense that it
communicates to Matter the special imperfect entity of the
latter,-- denied. (Thomas Harper, S.J. The Metaphysics £!
~School. II. Peter Smith, New York, 1881, 267.)
6 St • Thomas. ~ Spiritualibus Creaturis. art. 1.
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determined.

Alone, it c.ould neither exist nor be known.?

For both, another incomplete being, another !a! quo, the ror.m,
was required.

Setting aside the cognoscibility of prime

.matter, it might be added that St. Thomas went so far as to
say that even by divine omnipotence, matter could not exist
without the for.m.a

Why did Aristotle, and st. Thomas after

him, go to so much bother to stress the absolute potentiality
of prime matter?

As was said in chapter two9, any solution

which was to give the lie to Par.menides's dilemma had to be
a metaphysical solution, which was natural enough since the
whole problem was founded on a metaphysical basis.

As can

be easily recalled, being was one for the great Eleatic, and
from being which was already one,.being could not be produced.
Aristotle's tertium iuidlO between complete being and nothing was being in potency.
Would entitative act give birth again to this disturbing Par.menidean dilemma?

As was stated in the beginning

of this chapter, Suarez considered his teaching on the essence of prime matter to be different from that of St. Thomas
and Aristotle.

.. --- ...

~------

His divergence from his predecessors is found

7 St. Thomas. In I Phys. lect. 13·.
8 St. Thomas. Summa Theologica. I, q. 7, art. 2, ad 3.
quodl. q. 1, art. 1.
chapter II. 4.
0 ~.,a.

i
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in this concept of entitative act whiCh is not a mere modus
loquendi.

If it were, Suarez's notions on prime matter

would differ in no way from the theory of Aristotle and St.
Thomas.

Therefore, it must be act in the strict scholastic

sense of the tel'Jil... Then prime matter has essential composition and consequently, must be complete being.

Finally,

if it is complete being, it cannot be the substratum of
change, and Parmenides 1 s problem remains unsolved.
An analysis of the act itself will bring this into

clearer focus.

It is, according to Suarez, as much a part

of prime matter as the substantial form is of the composite.ll
Yet, although act, it does not destroy the incomplete nature
of prime matter.
potency.l2

It does not prevent matter from being pure

In short, it seems to be act and not to be act,

which is an obvious contradiction.

Now if it is act and

metaphysically required by prime matter, matter has composition and so is logically reduced to complete being, an
quod.

~

Union with the substantial form would demand a sub-

stantial change which in turn would demand another substratum
to serve as the basis of change, or leave the union of
matter and form a mere accidental aggregate.

_____ .. ___ _This

conclusion seems to be metaphysically valid.

ll Ibid., 17, 18, 19.

12

~.,

21.
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On metaphysical grounds a first subject which is the substra-

tum of change, while remaining unchanged, must be had.

Fur-

thermore, some metaphysical principle which differentiates
one being from another is required.
act.

This is the form or the

Since prime matter is the first subject and is pure

potency capable of receiving all forms, it, as such, has absolutely no need for act or form.

To give it act of any

kind implies a contradiction and disrupts the metaphysical
explanation which is the one solution to Parmenides's dilemma.
The next objection which Suarez offers against his
doctrine claims that his theory makes of prime matter an actual

entity~

This actual entity would be united with a sec-

ond actual entity, the form, thereby destroying the possibility of substantial union and making of the composite, not an
~

Eer .!!,, but

an~

per accidens.

Though this has been

mentioned above in passing, it will be here considered more
fully.

In the words of Suarez the objection is put thus:
Secunda, quia alias ex materia
et forma non fieret per se unum,
quia ex duobis entibus in actu
non fit unum per se; ideo enim
ex subjecto et accidente non fit
unum per se, quia aliud est esse
subject!, aliud accidentis.l3

---------13
Suarez.

Disputationes Metaphysicae.

Sect. 5, No. 16.
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Suarez answers as before by explaining another famous scholastic dictum:

Ex duobis entibus in actu non
fit unum per se non potest intelligi de quibuscumque entitatibus actualibus: nam potius
est impossibile ens per se ac
completum actu componi nisi ex
entibus incompletis; nam quod
nihil est, ut saepe diximus,
non potest ~ealiter componere,
et praesertim ens per se unum.
Debet ergo intelligi de entibus
in actu completis in suis generibus; illa enim nee per se ordinantur, nee recte cohaerent ad
compoaendum unum per se. Non
dicimus autem materiam esse hoc
modo ens actu, sed potius dicimus esse veluti quandam incohationem entia, quae naturaliter
inclinatur, et per se conjungitur formae ut complenti integrum
ens.l4
Suarez's answer is rather long and not altogether
to the point.

In brief, he states that prime matter and sub-

stantial for.m are two incomplete and dependent entities, not
two complete and independent realities.

Yet he does not

dispose of the main point of the difficulty, the entitative
act in prime matter.

It can be granted that matter is, "quan-

dam incohationem entia, quae naturaliter inclinatur, et per
se conjungitur for.mae ut complenti integrum ens", but the
14 -~~~~::-No. 17.
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main question remains unanswered.

If this entitative act is

true act and is found in prime matter, how can prime matter
be an incomplete being?

Again, there seems to be had the

basis for a contradiction.
is an incomplete substance.

Matter has its own act, yet it
Matter has its own act, yet it

can be united with the form in such a way that the resulting
composite is a substantial unit.

The too obvious conclus-

ion here is that Suarez's concept of prime matter leaves the
problem of change in the same curious position in which Parmenides found it when he first established his monistic
theory of being.
The third objection further elucidates the manifest contradiction apparent in Suarez's notions on prime
matter.

The difficulty takes its roots in the simplicity,

a negative simplicity it is true, which Aristotle and the
scholastics

p~edicated

of prime matter.

it must be exclusive of all act.

If matter is simple,

Any kind of act implies

composition and so destroys the note of simplicity in matter.
The objection as found in the Disputationes Metaphysicae
takes the following form:
Tertia, materia est omnino simplex; ergo vel tota est actus,
vel tota potentia, quia simplex
entitas non potest constare ex
actu et potentia physicis. Sed
non potest dici quod tota est
actus, cum essentialiter sit
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potentia; ergo est omnino
potentia nihil includens actus.l5
In answer to this Suarez hinges his refutation on
the real identity he claims for essence and existence.

From

this principle which is at the root of his idea of matter, a
fact which has already been mentioned in chapter two, he
argues:
••• materiam totam esse potentiam et totam esse actum, qualem nos explicuimus, non per
compositionem actus potentia,
sed per identitatem, et (ut ita
dicam) per intimam et transcendentalem inclusionem; non enim
omnia potentia opponitur omni
actui, sed cum proportione, potentia igitur recpptiva non
opponitur actui entitativo incompleto, sed potius illum essentialiter 1ncludit.l6
This response to a very fundamental difficulty
seems to be a begging of the

quest~on.

Rather, Suarez goes

back to explain the relationship that exists between the
various potencies and their acts;

and ends by asserting that

potency essentially includes entitative act.
core of the objection?

What is the

It proposes a complete disjunction:

prime matter is either pure potency or it is pure act.
Ibid., No. 16.
Ibid., No. 18.

iR
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According to Suarez's theory neither member of this disjunction can stand.

Since no one favors the latter part, atten-

tion can be centered on the first.

How can matter have this

act and still be, "omnino simplex"?

Suarez gives no answer.

According to him essence and existence are identical.
fore matter must have existence.

There-

If this be admitted, the

same contradiction is evidenced that was pointed out in the
two preceeding objections.
has act.

Matter is entirely simple, yet it

Matter is pure potency which implies total absence

of act, yet it has its own entitative act.

Carry this out

further and it must be concluded that matter is not simple,
but composite, and being comes from being which is a further
contradiction.
The fourth objection follows as a subsumption from
the one treated above.

Based on the opposition which exists

between pure potency and pure act, it procedes as follows:
Quarta, quia purus actus ita est
actus, ut nihil habeat admistum
potentialitatem, seu potentiam
receptivam; ergo e contrario
pura potentia ita est potentia
ut nihil habeat actualitatis
admistum; nam oppositorum
eadem est ratio; et quia pura
potentia debet summe distare a
summo actu; non distaret summe
si ali~uid actualitatis includeret. 7
i7--~---~-

~.,
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Suarez's refutation demands a few words of explanation lest the gist should be lost.

It would seem that he

intends in this instance, to exclude Infinite Being from his
consideration and confine himself to finite act.
act does not exclude active potentiality;
entitative potentiality.

Now finite

nor indeed all

A fortiori it does not exclude all

metaphysical potency, which is essentially included in the
contingency of its being.
potentiality.

What it does exclude is a passive

In like manner, .pure subjective and passive

potency does not exclude entitative act.

How could it avoid

being but a mere concept of the mind if' 1 t did?
exclude, as

w~s

'What it does

stated before, is all actuating or informing

act.lB
The refutation to the objection runs along the
same lines as the answers to the three that have gone before.
Everything is granted the adversaries, except the denial of
entitative act.

Pure potency has nothing of actuating or

informing act included in it, but it does have entitative
act.

Otherwise, it would be nothing.

Its one and only

claim to reality is derived from this entitative act.
Suarez cannot understand how it could be otherwise.
If prime matter were being in the strict sense of
18

~.,

No. 19.
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the term, Suarez's stand might be tenable.

But according to

the Aristotelian concept, it cannot be being in the strict
sense.

As Aristotle conceived it, prime matter is being in

an analogous sense only.
principle of being;
being is derived.

It is being in potency;

it is a

it is the subject from which complete
In other words, prime matter does not

have being in the same sense as the composite has it.

Only

by rational deduction and analogy is this difficult concept
reached.

Deduction also shows that it must be incomplete

being, and incomplete being in such a way that act

of any

kind not only is not necessary, but utterly impossible if
the problem of change is to be explained metaphysically.
The conclusion to these observations must be the
same one that has been drawn from the answers to the last
three objections.

The Suarezian concept of prime matter

carries with it contradictions of such a nature that the
system can hardly be used as an adequate solution to the
problem of change.

Indeed, it is feared that this solution

reduces the problem of change to the statement of Parmenides:

"ex ente non fit ens".
There is a fifth and final objection which we in-

tend to examine.

The gist of the difficulty is that if

there is act in prime matter, then prime matter is substance in the strict sense, or it is an accident.

In the
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words of the great Doctor himself the objection reads as
follows:
Quinta, quia materia aliquid est
actu, ergo vel substantia vel accidens; non secundum ut per se
constat; neque primum, quia est
potentia ad substantiam; quod
autem est potentia ad aliquid,non
est actu illudmet, nam duo repugnat
haec.l9
In the answer to this Suarez says:
Ad quintam respondetur, materiam
esse substantiam. • • Unde materia
non est potentia ad totam latitudinem substantiae, sed ad formam et
ad esse compositi; ad substantialem autem entitatem materiae non est
in potentia, sed actu est talis entitas. Repugnat enim dari potentiam
realem et receptivam respectu totius
generis et latitudinis substantiae,
ut completam et incompletam compTehendit, quia substantia prior est
accidente; et ideo talis potentia,
cum sit pr~ subjectum, non potest
esse accidens sed substantia; neque
etiam potest esse in potentia ad seipsum; ergo nee potest esse in potentia ad totam latitudinem substantiae.20
This objection, if the first member be considered,
has force against Suarez's position and further shows the
precariousness of a theory that demands entitative act in

---------19 ~., No.

16.
20 ~., No. 20.
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the first subject and material cause of all things.

Falling

back upon Aristotle's principles which have validity in
Suarez's eyes, the mind finds it difficult to conceive of a
pure potency which has some act.

Therefore, it finds dif-

ficulty in not conceiving a pure potency with entitative
act as anything but a substance, in fact as a complete substaace.
Pushing this notion of prime matter and its cognoscibility a bit further, we can question Suarez's idea of
what is meant by "pure potency".
has a potency for the form.

He says that prime matter

Appealing to Aristotle through

Father Hoenen, one can better say:
Materia est potentia ens simpliciter, quod ulterius determinari debet ad esse simpliciter,
sive substantiale, i.e. ad esse
primum, ~ .!!2!!, .!,!! aliquid quod
habet potentiam, sed ipsa est E2tentia ad esse simpliciter:z!
In other words Suarez makes a very subtle distinction between matter as pure potency and matter in pure potency.
For him they are not the same.

With Aristotle he maintains

that "pure potency" looks only to the informing act;

while

"in pure potency" is considered an incorrect way of speak21 Peter Hoenen, S.J. Cosmologia. Roma, 1936, 277.
Aristotle. Metaphysics. IV, 4, l007b, 28.

Also
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ing if by it one int.ends to exclude from matter all actuality.22 By such a process of reasoning it would seem that
Suarez, in fact though not in theory, is denying a very
fundamental thesis of the scholastic system, subjective
passive potency.23 He adheres faithfully to the traditional
terms, but reductively, he seems to be treating only of
logical potency.24

Had he done otherwise and handled his

study of prime matter in the traditional manner, both in
theory and in fact, he would not have been forced to postulate this entitative act.

Without this entitative act

he would not open his theory to the same censure that has
been put upon so many of the explanations of change given
after the time of Parmenides.
an

~

Finally he would not have had

quod, and would not have endangered the validity of

his metaphysics by incorporating into his theory of prime
matter contradictions which renew the age-old dilemma of
Parmenides.

~~-S~;;;;:

Disputationes Metaphysicae. Sect. 9, No. 13.
L. Mahieu. Suarez,~ Philosophie. Paris, 1921, 282.
24 P.G.M. Manser. Das-Wesen Des Thomismus. F.Rutschi,
Freiburg (SchweiZT; l935, 606.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
After the preceding discussion and argumentation
it is now possible to draw some conclusions from Suarez's
teachings on the essence of prime matter as well as from his
philosophy in general.

That his concept of prime matter is

one that is at variance with the doctrine of Aristotle and St.
Thomas is a fact that can hardly be controverted.l

Beyond

controversy, too, is his point of departure from the tenets
of the Aristotelian and Thomistic school.

As has often been

repeated in this paper, Aristotle and Thomas taught that
prime matter was pure potency devoid of any act, while Suarez
postulated for it what he is pleased to call entitative act.
This entitative act upon which Suarez builds his
notions of prime matter was not a concept. unheard of prior to
his time.

Long before, it had made its appearance in the

writings of philosophers of great repute and of repute not so
great.

Scotus, Henry of Ghent, Ockam, Gregory of Rimini,

Durandus, and Gabriel Biel, to mention but a few, were staunch
l Fridericus Saintonge, S.J. Summa Cosmolofia. Imprimerie
Du Messager, Montreal, 1941, 370. Also • DeRaeymaeker.
MetaEhisica Generalis. Apud E. Warny, Lovanii, 1936, 314316.
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defenders of the entitative act, if not in name,
idea.

certain~y

in

That Suarez came directly under the influence of all

of these save Ockam, is evident from his writings wherein he
calls upon them to substantiate his arguments.

At least in-

directly, Ockam, the father of Nominalism, helped to color
Suarez's opinions.

This can be deduced from the fact that

he recognized in Biel an authority upon whom he could rely.
Now Gabriel Biel, the last of the scholastics, in his chief
work, Collectorium, shows himself a faithful and painstaking
exponent of the Nominalistic doctrines.

Ockam, Biel's master,

following the lead of Peter Aureolus and Durandus, was the
single individual who crystallized and most widely propagated
the

philosoph~cal

heresy known as Nominalism or Terminism.

That Suarez saw something good in Nominalism can
be gathered from one passage of the Disputationes Metaphysicae
where in speaks in a strain that shows more than a healthy
·tolerance for the whole system.
Et merito reprehendendi aunt Nominales quoad loquendi modos, nam
in re fortasse non dissident a
vera sententia: nam eorum rationes hunc solum tendunt, ut ~obent
universalitatem non esse in rebus,
sed convenire illis prout in intellectu, seu per denominationem ab
aliquo opere intellectus, quod verum
est.2

~-s~;;;;:·Disputationes Metaphysicae.
No. 1.

Disp. VI, Sect. 2,
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While the super-tolerance of the first part of the quotation
might be passed off lightly, one is led to be more than
amazed upon consideration of the second part.

While even

this may admit favorable interpretation, as it stands it is
a dangerous and surprising commitment.

This passage, along

with others which can be gathered from his works, adds weight
to the contention that Suarez was unable to purge his metaphysics of the bl.ight of Nominalism.

With the Nominalists,

though not necessari1y because of them, he denied the real
distinction between essence and existence.

In accord with

them and as a direct corollary to this concept of essence
and existence, Suarez held that prime matter had its own entitative

a~t,

though it had this act with a transcendental

relation to the substantial form.

These Nominalistic ten-

dencies of the great Doctor can be succinctly summarized in
the following quotation:
J

• • • Suarez • • • esprit eminent,
sans conteste • • • vivat, co.mme
ses con~e~porains, dans une ambiance crei:e )'ar
nomina:Usme, ~t
que, m~lgre sa reaction expressement real;ste ~n log;que, 11 n'a~
ait pas reu~sia se degager completement en metaphysique, d'influences
qui diminuaient •• d 1 aucuns disent:
qui faussaient •• d' avance la port'e d'un effort meritoire. Suarez
en effet, comma Duns Scot, comme
Occam, pose en th~se la connaissance intellectuelle directe du singulier materiel, 1 1 individuat1on

1'
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des choses sensibles independendamment de leur mati~re 1 1 identitlr~elle de 1 1 essenc~ et de
t•existe~ce dans les ~reatures,
l'"entite" de le; I?atiere et de
la forme considerees en ellesm~mes, etc. ~ • 3
Yet again Suarez's whole approach to philosophy
may be set down as a partial cause

for the attitude he took

towards many problems, including the essence

or

prime matter.

In outlook Suarez was intent on satisfying the exigencies not
only

or

metaphysics, but also those of the empirical sciences.

To accomplish this it was necessary to bring under a unified
system the doctrines

or

Thomas and Scotus.

So preoccupied

was he with this that he,"avowedly pursues the path
balance between Scotism and Thomism".4

or

By this method he

hoped to find a common ground for the meeting of philosophy
and the physical sciences which were beginning to gain popularity in his day.

In all this it seems that Suarez failed

to remember that many metaphysical concep,ts would never
suffer boiling in a test tube.

Prime matter, empirically

considered, cannot be conceived as an incomplete being which
has not at least a grain of perfection.

Empirically viewed,

3 J. Marechal, s. J. Le r.int de Depart de la Metaphysique.•
Paris, Alcan, 1927,-rs •
4
Erich Przywara, S.J. Polarity. Translated by A.C. Bouquet,
D.D. Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, London,
1935, 110.
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prime matter had to be endowed with same kind of act.

In

other words, Suarez directed all his attention to the singular
individual and to direct experience, intellectual or sensible,
which alone could grasp it.
Suarez's first principles.

This is but the flowering of
To the end he was a man who follow-

ed the inevitable force of logic to its inevitable conclusion.
Though brutally logical, such a concept of prime
matter and its essential composition seems to take the problem
of change back to where Parmenides found it.

Why?

As has

been argued in chapter four of this thesis, entitative act is
act or it is not.

Since there is absolutely no doubt that

Suarez considers it to be act, prime matter is essentially
composed.

Granted that matter has composition, then two

problems arise.

First, how can matter fUnction as the ul-

'timate substratum of change and still be called first matter?
Secondly, how can this matter with its entitative act be united with the substantial form?

Suarez offers a solution to

this latter difficulty by appealing to a mode of union.5

Yet

this mode does not seem to be a true metaphysical answer to
the problem.
~o in casu unio relate ad constitutiva elementa videtur extrinseca: non per se sed per
aliud efficitur. Praeter unio~~---~---~

5 suarez.
No. 8.

Disputationes MetaRhysicae.

Disp. XXXVI, Sect.

3
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nem ele.menta eoneipi possunt;
quare aliud est eompositum et
alia aunt componentia, nisi
eomponentibus modus addatur.6
By means of this mode matter would not only be joined to the
form "per aliudr but the resultant would be an accidental
and

not an essential composite.

The substantial form would

be something superadded to the matter, and according to St.
Thomas, ••• "illud quod superadvenit non dat esse actu simpliciter materiae, sed esse actu tale, sieut acctdentia
faciunt; ••• Unde, quando talia forma acquiritur, non dicitur
generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid~ 7

Finally, from this

it would seem that Suarez is forced to conclude that prime
matter is an

~

guod or a complete being.

Suarez vero distinctionem realem metaphysieam in ordine essendi
non applicans, neque in ordine
quidditatis lllam applicare valet,
ideoque materiam ut quoddam ens
tractare cogitur et subject! unitatem servare nequit.S
In other words it seems that logic would force him to admit
that, "ex ante non fit
and

ens~

And so the circle is completed

Parmenides's problem once more clamors for solution.

~-~~;~;,;;eker.

315.

St. Thomas. ~~!! Essentia. Chapter 2.
8 DeRaeymaeker. 316.
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